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I. INTRODUCTION

Congress frequently delegates to agencies, and a host of
Supreme Court decisions have articulated tests for determining what
level of deference courts should give to agency interpretations of their
statutory directives. Courts have historically undertaken these
analyses in the context of a single agency. Congressional authorization
of joint rulemaking authority is more complicated, however, and the
traditional frameworks for review are inadequate.
When Congress delegates authority to multiple agencies, courts
should review the agencies' rules with heightened deference. The
traditional framework for judicial review of agency rules is ill
equipped when rules are promulgated by multiple coordinated
agencies. The prevalence of this type of delegation in recent legislation
underscores the need to reconsider the framework under which courts
review multiagency rules. For instance, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 20101 ("Dodd-Frank Act")
delegates broad authority to multiple agencies to promulgate rules
jointly and in consultation with one another. 2 One particularly
contentious provision of the Dodd-Frank Act delegates authority to the
Treasury Department, the Federal Reserve Board, the Comptroller of
the Currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Company, and the
Securities and Exchange Commission to implement the "Volcker
Rule"3 by issuing joint rules. 4 Given the lengthy delays and

1. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
2. John F. Cooney, Chevron Deference and the Dodd-Frank Act, 37 ADMIN. & REG. L.
NEWS, Spring 2012, at 7, 7.
3. The Volcker Rule will essentially restrict banks' ability to engage in proprietary trading.
When the Rule is issued, it will have a big impact on a multitude of parties, particularly financial
institutions. Thus, the Rule is likely to generate contentious litigation. See Kayla Tausche, No
Volcker Rule Until 2013: Sources, CNBC (Nov. 28, 2012, 3:54 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/
id/49891446; see also Scott Patterson & Deborah Solomon, A Simple Bank Rule Proves Difficult
to Write, WALL ST. J., Sept. 11, 2013, at Al.
4. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 619.
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contentious issues discussed during the notice-and-comment period,5
the Volcker Rule itself is sure to generate a substantial volume of
litigation. The recent issuance of the final rule will likely bring to light
unresolved issues in judicial review of multiagency rules.6
Particularly, the question of which agency has interpretive
authority over a statute when multiple coordinated agencies are
charged to promulgate rules will likely prove vexing to the courts. In a
recent article, John Cooney framed the dilemma as follows: "The
issues presented may well include the question, long identified but not
decided by the Supreme Court, concerning which agency's
interpretation of a statute, if any, is entitled to deference under
Chevron, when Congress has delegated equal and overlapping
authority to multiple agencies."7 While this question is an important
one, it assumes that the Court will only afford Chevron deference to
one agency in the realm of coordinated, multiagency rulemaking. This
Note focuses on a slightly different question: Should courts employ a
new paradigm for interpretive deference when multiple agencies
jointly promulgate a single rule and Congress clearly intended for
more than one agency to administer the statute?
The traditional Chevron framework is a one-agency model and
is thus inappropriate for judicial review of the complex, multiagency
form of congressional delegation. Instead, courts should employ an
ultradeferential form of review, both to advance the likely benefits of
coordinated, multiagency rulemaking and to ensure that courts do not
venture into the policymaking realm when Congress makes it
abundantly clear that it wants a group of agencies, not courts, to be
the primary interpreters of the statute.8
5.
Patterson & Solomon, supra note 3 ("[The rule languishes unfinished and unenforced,
mired in policy tangles . . . among five separate agencies whose job it is to produce the fine
print.").

6.

Peter Eavis, 'Long and Arduous Process' to Ban a Single Wall Street Activity, N.Y.

TIMES (Dec. 10, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/12/10/long-and-arduous-process-to-bana-single-wall-street-activity/?ref=volckerrule; see also Cooney, supra note 2, at 7.
Cooney, supra note 2, at 7 (emphasis added).
7.

8.

See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordinationin Shared Regulatory Space, 125

HARV. L. REV. 1131, 1184 (2012) (discussing the benefits of coordination on regulations); Jacob E.

Gersen, Overlapping and UnderlappingJurisdictionin Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV.
201, 202-03 (discussing the allocation of decisionmaking authority among different government

institutions); Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress's Choice of Delegate: Judicial
and Agency Interpretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363, 372-73 (2010) (discussing the
choice Congress faces between delegating interpretive authority to courts or agencies); see also
FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 123 (2000) ("This is hardly an ordinary
case. Contrary to the agency's position from its inception until 1995, the FDA has now asserted
jurisdiction to regulate an industry constituting a significant portion of the American economy.").
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This Note argues for a shift in the traditional Chevron
framework when (1) Congress delegates coordinated rulemaking
authority to multiple agencies and (2) those agencies promulgate rules
pursuant to that statutory mandate.9 Part II discusses why and how
Congress delegates to agencies and surveys the Supreme Court's
framework for reviewing such agency action. Part III demonstrates
that Chevron is a one-agency model and argues that the rise in
coordinated, multiagency rulemaking complicates the Court's
traditional approach to judicial review. Finally, Part IV proposes that
the Court break from the traditional model and accord the fused
agencies heightened deference when reviewing the joint rules.10
II. THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN CONGRESS, AGENCIES, AND COURTS
The modern administrative state could not function without
broad delegations from Congress to agencies." Public-choice and
agency theories both commonly recognize that Congress is most likely
to delegate power to agencies when delegation promotes legislative
efficiency.12 This Part explores the reasons for and methods of
congressional delegation that should inform the way courts review
agency decisions.13 Next, this Part outlines the role that courts have
actually played in policing agency rules.
Congressional delegation to administrative agencies gained
broad acceptance and became ubiquitous as a mechanism for
9.
Cooney, supra note 2, at 7 ("To implement its preferred allocation of authority among
the supervisory agencies, Congress repeatedly declined to give any one agency primacy in
implementation of a statutory provision. Rather, it granted equal authority to multiple agencies,
each of which was directed to issue joint regulations carrying out ambiguous statutory
provisions. . . .").
10. This Note does not address the problem that would arise if two different agencies, both
delegated coordinated rulemaking authority under the statute, came to different interpretations
of the joint rule within each particular agency's domain. However, the principles behind
heightened deference for multiagency rules might also guide the Court addressing judicial
review of single-agency interpretations of multiagency rules.
11. LISA BRESSMAN ET AL., THE REGULATORY STATE 140 (2010).
12. David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case for the Administrative State, 89
GEO. L.J. 97, 105-06 (2000); see also David Epstein & Sharyn O'Halloran, The Nondelegation
Doctrine and the Separation of Powers: A Political Science Approach, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 947,
963-64 (1999) (explaining that Congress retains the creation of tax policy despite the
considerable resources required because of political benefits).
13. Most of the Chevron literature discusses how the Court can get to the heart of what
Congress was actually attempting to do, either by attacking Chevron as out of line with
congressional intent, see, for example, David J. Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron's Nondelegation
Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 203, or arguing that the presumption of delegation is similar to
what Congress actually does, see, for example, Lisa Schultz Bressman, Reclaiming the Legal
Fictionof CongressionalDelegation, 97 VA. L. REV. 2009, 2028 (2011).
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implementing statutes over the latter part of the twentieth century. 14
The Court has also given its stamp of approval to congressional
delegation, despite earlier attempts to thwart the practice under the
nondelegation doctrine. 15 Today, Congress can freely delegate so long
as it supplies an "intelligible principle" to guide the agency in filling
the gaps of the statute.16 In Mistretta v. United States, the Court
articulated its broad view of the intelligible principle requirement as
follows: "Applying this 'intelligible principle' test to congressional
delegations, [the Court's] jurisprudence has been driven by a practical
understanding that in our increasingly complex society, replete with
ever changing and more technical problems, Congress simply cannot
do its job absent an ability to delegate power under broad, general
directives." 7
Congress does not delegate equally, however. Each delegation
specifies the various institutional designs and mechanisms through
which Congress can check agency action in each unique context.
Sometimes Congress delegates broadly. Sometimes Congress cabins
agency authority. Sometimes Congress requires agencies to adhere to
procedural requirements that go beyond those required in the
Administrative Procedure Act ("APA").18 Increasingly, Congress
delegates authority to more than one agency.19 Carefully making these
institutional design choices helps ensure that agencies stay within the
bounds of their delegated authority.
A. Why Congress Delegates
The sentiment conveyed by the Supreme Court in Mistretta is
broadly shared by legal scholars: the complexity of governance

14. BRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 142.
15. This constitutional doctrine forbade congressional delegation of legislative power based
on Article 1, Section 1 of the United States Constitution. For the last example of the Court
invalidating a statute under the nondelegation doctrine, see A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v.
United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935) (invalidating portions of the National Industrial
Recovery Act under the nondelegation doctrine).
16. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr.,
& Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)); see also Kevin M. Stack, The Constitutional
Foundations of Chenery, 116 YALE L.J. 952, 958 (2007) (discussing the initial formulation of the
"intelligible principle" requirement as one component of a two-part test).
17. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
18. Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5
U.S.C. (2012)).
19. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1134.
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requires Congress to delegate broad policymaking authority. 20 It has
also prompted scholars to ask why and under what conditions
Congress is more likely to delegate to agencies. 21 While there is some
dispute about which rationales motivate Congress the most, 22 there is
general agreement that Congress delegates to conserve legislative
resources and to get reelected. 23 For instance, Congress delegates to
avoid contentious issues, to take advantage of an agency's comparative
expertise over a given subject matter, 24 to obtain consensus on
legislation, 25 and to take advantage of agencies' greater flexibility to
adapt to changing circumstances. 2 6 All of these specific motivations
allow members of Congress to be more efficient and advance their
reelection prospects.
Congress typically delegates to agencies when it is politically
advantageous or more efficient. Most literature on congressional
motives assumes that members of Congress are primarily driven by
reelection. 27 From this perspective, the key motivating factor behind
delegating a particular policy issue seems to be avoiding politically
perilous issues. 28 After all, individual members can then take credit
for agency successes and still deflect blame for agency failures. 29
Moreover, Congress is an institution filled with generalists, so
agency expertise is widely recognized as one motivating factor for
congressional delegation. 30 Both critics and defenders of the Chevron
20. See Lemos, supra note 8, at 364 ("[Delegations are inevitable. Congress lacks the time,
resources, foresight, and flexibility to attend to every conceivable detail of regulatory policy.");
Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 315-16 (2000) (positing that
the broad idea of a nondelegation doctrine is no longer viable, but that the doctrine shows up in
canons that limit agency action in specific ways).
21. See Epstein & O'Halloran, supra note 12, at 950 ("Legislators delegate authority in
those areas-such as pork barreling in appropriations bills, military base closings, and trade
policy-where the legislative process produces inefficient outcomes."); Lemos, supra note 8, at
368-69 (citing agency expertise and flexibility, congressional time constraints, and politically
infeasible resolution in Congress as reasons for delegation).
22. Compare Epstein & O'Halloran, supra note 12, at 961 (offering a public choice
explanation of delegation), with Barron & Kagan, supra note 13, at 203-05 (suggesting that
Congress makes strategic choices about when courts should defer to agencies).
23. Lemos, supra note 8, at 368.
24. See STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OuR DEMOCRACY WORK 110 (2010) (discussing
comparative expertise as a rationale for judicial deference).
25. Lemos, supra note 8, at 369.
26. BRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 140.
27. Epstein & O'Halloran, supra note 12, at 952, 962.
28. Id.; Lemos, supra note 8, at 369.
29. Epstein & O'Halloran, supra note 12, at 961-62.
30. See Lemos, supra note 8, at 368 ("Whereas agencies have (or can accumulate) special
expertise in their areas of authority, legislators tend not to be experts, and the costs of educating
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decision agree that agency expertise was a primary reason for the
Court's presumption that Congress delegated authority to an agency. 31
Indeed, along with political accountability, agency expertise provided
the second major pillar of the Chevron doctrine. 32 When an issue is
technical and agency expertise is important, delegation is more
likely. 33
Congress delegates for other reasons as well. Recent literature
suggests that Congress sometimes delegates to ensure consensus on a
bill that otherwise might divide the legislative body if it had to iron
out the details of legislation. 34 At the very least, Congress does think
about when to take more control over the details of a statute and
regulatory scheme and when to delegate those matters to an agency. 35
B. How Congress Delegates:A Variety of Forms
Of course, Congress decides more than simply whether to
delegate authority. It must also decide how to delegate authority. 36
Congressional delegations take a variety of forms, demonstrating that
Congress is attentive to how its directives are carried out.37 Much of
the scholarship in this area focuses on how delegations to agencies
maintaining
political
agency
expertise
while
maximize
Congress would be prohibitive.'); Spence & Cross, supra note 12, at 136 ("For informational
reasons, a Congress charged with making regulatory decisions is likely to produce inferior
ones.").
31. See, e.g., Lisa Schultz Bressman, Chevron's Mistake, 58 DuKE L.J. 549, 576 (2009)
(noting the Chevron Court's observation that Congress may delegate interpretive authority to an
agency because of its superior informational position); Evan J. Criddle, Chevron's Consensus, 88
B.U. L. Rev. 1271, 1286 (2008) (stating that agencies' greater experience in the relevant field
provides a popular justification for Chevron deference); see also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) ("Perhaps [Congress] consciously desired the
Administrator to strike the balance at this level, thinking that those with great expertise and
charged with responsibility for administering the provision would be in a better position to
do so. . . .").
32. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66.
33. Id. at 963-64.
34. Lemos, supra note 8, at 369.
35. See Epstein & O'Halloran, supra note 12, at 961-62 (describing how Congress must
make choices when policy is made and must weigh the costs of either delegating to agencies or
writing the laws themselves).
36. See, e.g., Kevin M. Stack, The President'sStatutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106
COLUM. L. REV. 263, 316 (2006) ("[Congress] must determine to whom to grant power, what
organizational structure to create, what administrative processes to require, and how the
recipients of statutory authority may be removed.").
37. See, e.g., BRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 11 (discussing the choice between
allocating authority to an Independent or Executive Agency); Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at
1134 (discussing how Congress sometimes delegates overlapping authority to different agencies).
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accountability. 38 Congress creates varied forms of regulatory regimes
using different statutory language for different policy contexts. 39
Sometimes Congress is explicit, cabining an agency's authority to a
specific realm. 40 In other statutes, Congress is vague, issuing a broad
delegation that leaves vast space in which an agency can operate. 41
Congress also creates extrajudicial checks on agency action to ensure
accountability and sound policymaking. 42 In short, Congress uses
various institutional designs and procedural requirements to achieve
an appropriate level of agency involvement in each policymaking
context. 43
1. Choices of Institutional Design
In terms of institutional design, Congress is often deliberate
when deciding whether to delegate authority to an executive or
independent agency. 44 Executive agencies have greater political
accountability, while independent commissions are more shielded
from political pressures.45 The decision to grant authority to a specific
type of agency attests to the fact that Congress cares about political
accountability when it delegates authority. 46

38. See, e.g., Lemos, supra note 8, at 365 ("[C]ommentators have identified various
characteristics of agency decisionmaking and institutional structure-agencies' expertise ... and
their responsiveness to the political branches-that make agencies tolerable (and perhaps even
superior) substitutes for congressional lawmaking.").
39. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1168.
40. BRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 140 (discussing how Congress can give agencies
specific targets or requirements in a statutory delegation).
41. Id. (giving the National Highway Transportation Safety Act as an example of a statute
that delegated broadly).
42. Epstein & O'Halloran, supra note 12, at 958-60 (discussing congressional controls on
agency action). Of course, effectuating congressional intent does not necessarily lead to good
policy. But, it seems like a safe assumption that Congress believes the policy to be good, or it
would not have enacted it in the first place. So, to the extent that Congress seeks to align agency
policymaking with the intent of the statute, it is trying to advance "good" policymaking.
43. See Stack, supra note 36, at 316 (discussing how Congress makes choices of institutional
design and procedural requirements).
44. See id. at 11-13 (discussing the differences in political accountability between the two
types of agencies); see also Rachel E. Barkow, InsulatingAgencies: Avoiding Capture Through
InstitutionalDesign, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 15 (2010) (discussing how Congress is purposeful about
the choice to create an independent or executive agency). While executive agencies are directly
accountable to the President, independent agencies are more politically insulated.
45. See FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 547 (2009) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (noting that an independent commission had "freedom from ballot-box control").
46. BRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 11 (examining the differences between appointment
and removal powers between independent and executive branch agencies); see also Fox, 556 U.S.
at 547 (discussing how independent agencies are shielded from political influences).
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When Congress authorizes an agency or agencies to
promulgate rules through notice-and-comment rulemaking, the
statute explicitly confers authority on the agency to fill in any
statutory gaps. 47 Congress, however, is not always explicit about its
delegations of authority to administrative agencies. 48 Sometimes,
Congress plainly and explicitly delegates rulemaking authority to
administrative agencies.49 Other times, Congress delegates authority
to agencies, but not rulemaking authority.50 Either way, the inclusion
or exclusion of informal, notice-and-comment-rulemaking authority is
an important institutional design choice that Congress makes when
delegating authority to an agency.5 1
2. Extrajudicial Checks
Congress also employs extrajudicial checks, including
heightened procedural requirements, when it delegates authority to
agencies.5 2 Put differently, Congress designs different structural
mechanisms-outside of judicial review under the APA-to ensure
that agency rules effectuate legislative intent. 53 Moreover, Congress
always retains some amount of control over agency decisions through
ordinary procedural requirements, control of the budget, and oversight
hearings.54

47. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843
(1984) ('The power of an administrative agency to administer a congressionally
created . .. program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill
any gap left, implicitly or explicitly, by Congress." (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231
(1974))).
48. BRESSMAN, ET AL, supra note 11, at 140 (using the Sherman Antitrust Act as an
example of general language being an implicit delegation to courts).
49. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (2012)).
50. See BRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 718 (discussing how some statutes confer
authority-but not rulemaking authority-on agencies).
51. See, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 236-39 (2001) (suggesting that the
use of notice-and-comment rulemaking would provide a safe harbor for agencies to receive
deference).
52. See Lemos, supra note 8, at 375 n.46 (citing Lisa Schultz Bressman, Procedures as
Politics in Administrative Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749, 1751-52 (2007)) (discussing how
Congress sometimes adds procedural requirements to control agency action).
53. Id. For the procedural requirements under the APA, see 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (2012).
54. Lemos, supranote 8, at 375.
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Furthermore, a number of statutes require multiagency
interactions prior to rulemaking,66 and some even require an agency to
get approval from another agency before taking action.56 These
consultation requirements seek to enhance agency coordination in
implementing complex regulatory regimes and to bring more and
varied types of expertise to bear on difficult problems.57
Congress also makes institutional design decisions about
delegating authority to a single agency or to multiple agencies.58
Congress can choose to require agency coordination before agencies
promulgate rules or take other action.59 This extrajudicial check often
improves agency efficiency in areas of bureaucratic overlap.60
Arguably, the strongest coordination requirement is a
congressional mandate that two or more agencies negotiate to
promulgate a joint rule. 61 Mandating joint rulemaking can solve
coordination problems for agencies with overlapping jurisdictions and
"improve both cumulative expertise and the quality of the
final. . . decision."62 Congress has increasingly mandated joint
rulemaking, especially in complex policy arenas that require
coordination among similar but distinct regulatory agencies. 63 The
variety of delegation regimes-both in terms of scope and institutional
design-suggests that Congress attends to institutional design in a

55. See Keith Bradley, The Design of Agency Interactions, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 745, 755
(2011) (describing how some statutes require agency consultation and coordination prior to
action).
56. Id. at 756 (explaining how some agency decisions require the approval of a directing
agency).
57. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1155-56, 1167-68 (discussing the various agency
consultation requirements, including joint rulemaking); Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation
of Powers: Checking Today's Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2317
(2006) (discussing the benefit of multiple agencies negotiating a shared position on an issue).
58. See Gersen, supra note 8, at 208-10 (discussing the different ways Congress can
delegate to one or multiple agencies).
59. See, e.g., J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, Public Agencies as Lobbyists, 105 COLUM. L.
REV. 2217, 2221-22 (2005) (discussing consultation requirements imposed on FERC).
60. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1184.
61. Because the negotiations and joint rules are mandated by Congress, agencies are
required by law to work together to fill in the statutory gaps. Because agencies are legally bound
to act in concert, the benefits of increased agency expertise and more thorough reasoning behind
the rule are enhanced more than when agencies have a choice whether to consult or when
Congress mandates less formal consultation requirements and the final rule is still issued by a
single agency. See id. at 1155-70 (discussing a variety of consultation requirements).
62. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1184.
63. See id. at 1168 (discussing how Congress recently required many rules to be issued
jointly in Dodd-Frank).
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way that it believes will keep agency policymaking in accord with
congressional intent. 64
3. What Is Congress Delegating and to Whom?
Congress delegates policymaking authority to agencies. In
essence, Congress wants agencies to exercise a gap-filling function by
formulating specific policy details from general statutory guidance. 65
Of course, if an agency has authority to implement a statute, it must
first determine what the statute means.66 Thus, policymaking
authority necessarily requires some degree of interpretive authority. 67
Some have criticized the courts for propagating a judge-centric
(rather than agency-centric) view of the fundamental nature of
delegation.68 Couched in terms of interpretive authority, Chevron and
the other deference doctrines mistakenly define what Congress and
agencies more properly regard as policymaking authority.69 Yet, this
distinction is mostly semantic. In the final analysis, courts simply
adjudge whether Congress wants the judiciary to defer to an agency in
performing its gap-filling function, which includes both interpretative
and policymaking elements.70
When Congress writes a statute that is ambiguous, it implicitly
grants courts interpretive authority.71 If Congress delegates authority
to agencies to implement a vague statute-especially when the
method chosen is notice-and-comment rulemaking-it also delegates
authority to interpret that statute. 72 Congress also has the backstop of
64. See supra Part II.A.2; see also Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1155-58 (discussing
mandatory consultation rules).
65. See, e.g., Lemos, supra note 8, at 364-65 (discussing that Congress can delegate policy
decisions to agencies).

66. See Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretationor Public Administration:How Chevron
Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why It Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 673, 675-78 (2007)
(criticizing the shift in judicial treatment of the role of agencies from "carrying out" statutes to
interpreting them).
67. Id.; see also City of Arlington, Tex. v. FCC, 133 S. Ct. 1863 (2013) (holding that courts
must apply the Chevron framework, even when agencies interpret ambiguous statutory
provisions relating to the scope of the agencies' authority, or their jurisdiction).
68. Id. at 676.
69. Id.
70. Foote, supra note 66, at 680-82.
71. BRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 140 ("[Dlelegation is implicit, as are all delegations
to courts."). As a matter of constitutional law, Congress knows that courts have authority to
interpret the statute. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.")
72. BRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 140, 400-01; Lemos, supra note 8, at 373-80
(discussing Congress's choice to delegate between courts and agencies).
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the APA,73 which ensures that courts will still have a role in reviewing
agency decisions after congressional delegation.74 Thus, even when
statutes are written ambiguously, Congress is aware that it is
delegating interpretive authority to agencies to administer statutes.75
C. The Court's Role in PolicingCongressionalDelegations
In recent years, the Supreme Court has developed various legal
doctrines to assess the validity of agency actions.76 However, courts
have struggled over when to defer to an agency's interpretation of a
statute that the agency itself is charged with implementing.77 Judicial
review becomes particularly complex when the implementation of the
statute requires an agency to exercise its interpretive authority.7 8
While the Court has developed multiple types of deference-including,
most famously, Chevron-the fundamental question of how much
deference agencies should receive in exercising their statutory gapfilling function remains a difficult one.
1. The Nondelegation Doctrine
While the exact parameters of the nondelegation doctrine are
disputed, it has largely gone unenforced since the early twentieth
century. 79 It is widely accepted that the practical complexities of the
administrative state in the twenty-first century require broad
statutory delegations.80 The Court made this clear in Mistretta, and
despite the volume of scholarship on the nondelegation doctrine, the
Court has not signaled that it will resurrect the doctrine from its

73. 5 U.S.C.
74.

§§ 701-06 (2006).

BRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 140.

75. See id. (discussing the "levers of control" used by Congress); Lemos, supranote 8, at 365
(asking what makes Congress "choose" from among its various delegation possibilities).
76. BRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 679.
77. Id. at 140-41.
78. While it can be argued that any agency action involves interpretation of a statute,
courts have created specific doctrines in situations where the agency interpretation is disputed.
This scenario has been looked at as distinct from administrative actions in which a particular
agency interpretation of the statute is not at issue (e.g., FTC enforcement actions).
79. BRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 141. Contra Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule,
Interring the Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1722 (2002) (arguing that the
nondelegation doctrine as it is known today is without legitimate constitutional foundation).
80. Posner & Vermeule, supra note 79, at 1722; see also Lemos, supra note 8, at 364
("Congress lacks the time, resources, foresight, and flexibility to attend to every conceivable
detail of regulatory policy.").
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New Deal-era grave.8 ' Some scholars have suggested that the Courtin the face of an increasingly powerful administrative state-has
revived aspects of the nondelegation doctrine through what Professor
Cass Sunstein has termed "nondelegation canons." 82 Whether it is
actually reviving the nondelegation doctrine through other means, the
Court has certainly played an active role in policing legislative
delegations and agency action since Chevron.88
2. Chevron and Its Foundation
Decided in 1984, Chevron established the oft-invoked two-step
test to determine whether an agency interpretation warrants
deference from a court.84 Under Step One, the court asks if Congress
has "directly spoken to the precise question at issue."8 If Congress has
not, then under Step Two, the court will defer to the agency's
interpretation as long as it is reasonable.86 While there is evidence
that courts actually employ a variety of deference regimes when
deciding whether to defer to an agency's interpretation of a statute,87
Chevron is considered the primary framework.88
Despite a continuing normative debate over the propriety of
Chevron,89 both critics and supporters of the doctrine generally agree
that Chevron's presumption of congressional delegation rests on two

81.

BRESSMAN ETAL., supra note 11, at 140.

82. See Sunstein, supra note 20, 315-16 ("[The nondelegation doctrine] has been relocated
rather than abandoned. Federal courts commonly vindicate not a general nondelegation doctrine,
but a series of more specific and smaller, though quite important, nondelegation doctrines."); see
also Jacob Loshin & Aaron Nielson, Hiding Nondelegation in Mouseholes, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 19,
22-23 (2010) (arguing that the "elephants in mouseholes" doctrine is a "ghost of the
nondelegation doctrine").
83. See, e.g., United States. v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229-31 (2001) (requiring agencies
to act pursuant to lawmaking authority in order to get Chevron deference); FDA v. Brown &
Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 159-61 (2000) (declining to give the FDA Chevron
deference because Congress could not possibly have implicitly delegated such a salient policy
issue); see also Bressman, supra note 13, at 2019-21 (discussing Mead).
84. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
85. Id. at 842.
86. Id. at 843; see also Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1207 (discussing how courts
determine whether an agency's interpretation is reasonable).
87. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme
Court Treatment of Agency Statutory InterpretationsFrom Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J.
1083, 1098-1120 (2008).
88. BRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 679.

89. See Criddle, supra note 31, at 1283-84 (discussing various rationales commentators
have proposed to justify Chevron deference).
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central pillars: agency expertise and political accountability.90 Writing
for a unanimous Court, Justice Stevens laid out the now widely cited
foundation for Chevron deference:
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political branch of the
Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not
on the basis of the judges' personal policy preferences. In contrast, an agency to which
Congress has delegated policy-making responsibilities may, within the limits of that
delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration's views of wise policy to
inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the
Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the
Government to make such policy choices-resolving the competing interests which
Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be resolved
by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday
91
realities.

Thus, the Court has been more likely to apply broad deference to
agency interpretations when doing so would promote agency expertise
and political accountability, as Congress would have intended. 92
3. Chevron Deviations
In recent years, the Court has shied away from automatically
applying Chevron and has shown signs that it will examine the
particular statutory regime and Congress's institutional-design
choices before affording deference to an agency interpretation. 93 Two
examples stand out. First, United States v. Mead Corp.94 created what
has been termed Chevron "Step Zero"'95 by adding a threshold question
to the traditional two-step Chevron test: did the agency action bind
with the force of law pursuant to a congressional delegation of

90. See Bressman, supra note 13, at 2030-33 (noting that when the Court determines
questions of congressional delegation, it considers the agency's policymaking expertise as well as
its political accountability); Criddle, supra note 31, at 1286-89 (discussing arguments for and
against justifying Chevron deference based on agency expertise and political accountability);
Stack, supra note 36, at 305 (stating that the Chevron Court explicitly considered agencies'
expertise in a given field as well as their political accountability as compared to federal judges).
91. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865-66.
92. See, e.g., Eskridge & Baer, supra note 87, at 1157 (finding that the Court was more
deferential to agencies when agency expertise was a salient factor in the interpretive process and
when the agency interpretation remained consistent over time).
93. See Bressman, supra note 13, at 2012 (noting that since Mead, the Court will look at
"other indications in the statutory context and the legislative history, asking whether Congress
reasonably intended to delegate interpretive authority."); see also Eskridge & Baer, supra note
87, at 1179 (discussing the Court's ad hoc approach that takes into account statutory context).
94. 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
95. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 187 (2001).
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authority to the agency to bind with the force of law?9 6 The essential
thrust of Step Zero is that an agency must use formal procedures with
a "lawmaking pretense" in order to be afforded Chevron's presumption
of deference. 97 If an agency did not act pursuant to such authority,
then the Court merely considers its persuasiveness under the less
deferential standard of Skidmore v. Swift. 98 Thus, Mead identifies
certain circumstances under which courts do not afford interpretive
deference to an agency because of the nature of the agency's authority
or the agency's exercise of that authority. 99 The Court will thereby
afford agencies less deference in circumstances where agency
interpretations are associated with actions that are not "lawlike" or do
not stem from the agency's authority to bind with the force of law. 100
Mead implicitly recognizes that Congress delegates in a variety
of ways and that Chevron deference does not apply in certain
contexts.'10 This idea is at odds with Chevron's broad presumption of
deference,102 and it has empowered courts to examine the specific
context of congressional delegation before automatically affording
deference to the agency.103
A second circumstance in which the Court has undertaken an
in-depth analysis of what Congress actually intended104-as opposed
to simply employing Chevron-is when an agency asserts authority
over a salient issue that Congress very likely did not intend to punt to
the agency. 105 In FDA v. Brown & Williamson, the Court declined to
give the Food and Drug Administration ("FDA") Chevron deference in
the realm of tobacco regulation, despite the agency's strong textual
argument. 06 Although the language of the Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act
96. Lisa Schultz Bressman, How Mead Has Muddled JudicialReview of Agency Action, 58
VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1444 (2005).
97. Mead, 533 U.S. at 233; see also Bressman, supra note 13, at 2021 (discussing Mead's
effect on the Chevron regime); Matthew P. Downer, Note, Tentative Interpretations: The
Abracadabra of Administrative Rulemaking and the End of Alaska Hunters, VAND. L. REV.
(forthcoming Apr. 2014) (discussing the Mead and Skidmore glosses on Chevron).
98. Mead, 533 U.S. at 227, 234-35; Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 139-40 (1944).
99. 533 U.S. at 226-27 (holding that Congress needs to delegate authority to bind with the
force of law and the agency needs to act pursuant to that authority in order for the Court to
grant the agency Chevron deference in its interpretation of the statute).
100. Id.
101. Bressman, supra note 13, at 2012.
102. See id. (discussing how the particularized inquiry rebuts the Chevron presumption).
103. Bressman, supra note 96, at 1469.
104. Bressman, supra note 13, at 2010.
105. Id. at 2018-20.
106. FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 133 (2000) (noting that "[the
Court] must be guided to a degree by common sense as to the manner in which Congress is likely

290

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:1:275

seemed to clearly authorize FDA regulation, the Court highlighted
Congress's history of tobacco-related legislation as evidence that
Congress did not want to cede control of that arena to the FDA.107
Finally, the Court noted that "[iun extraordinary cases . .. there may
be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended
such an implicit delegation."108 This presumption-that Congress
would not delegate authority in such a major policy arena without
explicit indication-has come to be called the "elephants-inmouseholes doctrine."o9
These two twists on the traditional Chevron framework show
that the Court is willing to police whether an agency action warrants
deference in the first place.11o Thought of in this way, these doctrines
alter the amount of judicial deference given to agencies to ensure that
they exercise their interpretive authority in accordance with
congressional intent. The Court's willingness to deviate from
traditional Chevron deference implies that the Court is willing to
examine how Congress delegated authority in determining the
appropriate level of deference."' In fact, recent empirical research
shows that the Court employs a variety of deference doctrines, but
seems to decide what level of deference is appropriate based on the
way in which Congress delegated authority and how that authority
was exercised, as explained in the following Section.112
4. A Spectrum of Deference
Despite its various tests and frameworks, which is often
couched in formalistic language, the Supreme Court has taken a
practical approach to questions of agency deference. While Chevron is
typically the prism through which scholars examine judicial deference
to agencies, William Eskridge and Lauren Baer have demonstrated
empirically that the Court does not invoke Chevron nearly as often as
many believe. Instead, they found that the Court actually employs a
variety of deference doctrines, depending on the "statutory subject
to delegate a policy decision of such economic and political magnitude to an administrative
agency."); see also Loshin & Nielson, supra note 82, at 30-33 (discussing the elephants-inmouseholes doctrine).
107. Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 157-59.
108. Id. at 159.
109. Loshin & Nielson, supra note 82, at 21, 24.
110. Bressman, supra note 13, at 2012.
111. See id. at 2018-19 (discussing how the Court undertook a particularized inquiry into
the statutory context rather than presuming delegation and deference).
112. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 87, at 1179.
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matter" and "institutional context."113 Their research indicates that, in
fact, the Court takes a particularized look at a given agency rule or
interpretation before deciding what level of deference to afford the
agency.114 The authors note that "statutory subject matter and
institutional context appear to be more important in the Justices' own
evaluation of agency action than the rhetorical 'deference' regime the
Justices attach to the case."" 5 This conclusion suggests that the Court
is frequently conducting a "particularized inquiry," despite the
common assumption that the Chevron framework governs the vast
majority of cases.116 Eskridge and Baer criticize the Court for its
overly complicated approach, but they also note that the "subjectmatter-driven ad hoc approach has not been a disaster and might
charitably be considered a practical success."' 17
Thus, it turns out that the answer to the question of how much
deference the Court is willing to give an agency also has a simple
answer: it depends. It depends on the institutional design chosen by
Congress and the extrajudicial checks it imposed on the agency." 8 If
Congress grants broad, informal rulemaking authority to an agency to
promote agency expertise and ensure political accountability, then
courts should be more willing to defer. Based on the research by
Eskridge and Baer, this seems to be what the Court has actually been
doing, despite its veritable grab bag of deference rules.119 Normatively,
this trend is exactly what we would hope to see if we continue to
adhere to the central pillars of Chevron.120 If the Chevron doctrine
exists to promote agency expertise and ensure political accountability,
the Court should review rules more deferentially when those factors
are at play.
Rules promulgated by multiple coordinated agencies, however,
have not yet been reviewed by the Supreme Court. Moreover, its past
cases involving multiple agencies charged with implementing a

113. Id.
114. See id. at 1090-91 (describing how the Court often takes an ad hoc approach based on
agency expertise and the particular statutory context).
115. Id.
116. See Bressman, supra note 13, at 2010 (discussing the particularized inquiry).
117. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 87, at 1179.
118. Id.
119. Eskridge and Baer identify at least seven different deference regimes and conclude that
the Court employs an ad hoc approach-invoking none of the regimes-in the majority of cases in
which it reviews agency action. Id. at 1098-117.
120. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984)
(discussing the role of the judiciary in reviewing challenges to agency action).
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statute leave great doubt as to whether the Court would be willing to
grant broad deference to a group of agencies.121
III. CHEVRON IS A ONE-AGENCY MODEL & CONGRESS'S BURGEONING
USE OF MULTIAGENCY DELEGATIONS PRESENTS A PROBLEM

When the Court grapples with multiagency rules under current
administrative law doctrine, it will run into trouble. The Court's
treatment of agency interpretations of general statutes and statutes
that delegate to more than one agency strongly suggest that Chevron
is a one-agency model. Even when the Court takes a nuanced
approach to Chevron by carefully examining the context of a
delegation, it still chooses to defer or not to defer to a single agency.
Congress has increasingly delegated to multiple agencies under the
same statute; the Court's current doctrine is inadequate.
A. Chevron: A One-Agency Model
While legal scholars disagree over why Congress gives agencies
overlapping delegations, 122 they broadly agree that the practice occurs
regularly. However, the Chevron framework implicitly presumes that
only one agency-if any at all-should be accorded deference in
statutory interpretation. Accordingly, courts have been forced to make
dubious assumptions about congressional intent in order to review
conflicting statutory interpretations by different agencies within the
traditional Chevron framework.123 The Court has yet to hear a case,
however, that directly confronts whether a multiagency interpretation
of a statute under a jointly promulgated rule should be granted
deference and, if so, which standard should apply.124 But such a case
may soon be heard. Through its previous treatments of multiagency
121. See Cooney, supra note 2, at 8-9 (discussing cases in which the Court has attempted to
pick a single agency to accord deference, in the context of multiagency statutes).
122. Compare Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1137 (discussing the benefits of overlapping
delegation), with Jason Marisam, Duplicative Delegations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 181, 198-218 (2011)
(arguing that duplicative delegations are inefficient and suggesting ways to avoid them).
123. See Gersen, supra note 8, at 220 ("[A]gency expertise has regularly been used as a
justification for not giving deference to agency views of shared jurisdiction statutes.").
124. Cooney, supra note 2, at 7. The Court addressed a joint regulation in Coeur Alaska, Inc.
v. Southeast Alaska Conservation Council, 557 U.S. 261, 275 (2011), but it analyzed the
interpretation as if it had been issued solely by one of the agencies, affording no weight in the
deference inquiry to the fact that the agencies involved had issued the regulation together. Id.
See also Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1204 (discussing Coeur and noting that "the majority
appeared to apply the relevant standards of review precisely as it would have done had the case
involved a single agency acting independently").
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statutes in other contexts, however, the Court has implied that it will
only give interpretive deference to one agency under Chevron.
The way that the Court has interpreted the doctrinal
foundations of Chevron and applied them to cases involving multiple
agencies with shared regulatory authority strongly suggests that
Chevron is a one-agency model.125 At times, Congress passes general
statutes to be implemented by multiple agencies, raising the question
of which agency, if any, deserves Chevron deference from the courts.126
Congress also passes statutes that delegate overlapping regulatory
authority to different agencies within a specific policy area.127 Both of
these scenarios present courts with the problem of whether to employ
Chevron deference, since the traditional rationales behind the doctrine
may or may not apply in these cases. 128 While expertise and
accountability could conceivably justify granting Chevron deference to
multiple agencies, 129 the Court has not applied Chevron in this way. 30
Instead, the Court has implicitly added a presumption to the Chevron
framework that, when Congress delegates interpretive authority, it
delegates it to a single agency.' 3 '
1. Statutes of General Applicability
In some instances, the Court will not afford judicial deference
to any agency at all. For instance, courts do not afford Chevron

125. Gersen, supra note 8, at 222-25. Gersen asserted that the Court uses an "exclusive
jurisdiction canon." Id. at 224. Whether it should be considered a separate canon or just an
explanation of Chevron itself, the Court has employed a one-agency framework when deciding
issues of interpretive deference when overlapping agency jurisdiction complicated the Chevron
question.
126. See id. at 221-22 (discussing Bowen v. Am. Hosp. Ass'n., 476 U.S. 610, 642 (1986)); see
also Cooney, supra note 2, at 7 (noting that "Congress directed as many as seven agencies to
issue joint regulations implementing" Dodd-Frank and "repeatedly declined to give any one
agency primacy").
127. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1146 (discussing the overlapping authority between
the FTC and DOJ).
128. Daniel Lovejoy, Note, The Ambiguous Basis for Chevron Deference: Multiple-Agency

Statutes, 88 VA. L. REV. 879, 882-84 (2002).
129. When Congress delegates to multiple agencies with similar comparative expertise-as
in the Dodd-Frank Act-the rationales behind the Chevron presumption of delegation would be
just as strong, so long as the Court believed that political accountability would not be hindered
under such a regime.
130. See, e.g., Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 266 (2006) ("[We presume here that
Congress intended to invest interpretive power in the administrative actor in the best position to
develop these attributes.").
131. See Gersen, supra note 8, at 223, 237-39 (discussing Martin v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144 (1990), and Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 243).
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deference at all to laws of general applicability. 132 For example, agency
interpretations of statutes like the Freedom of Information Act, the
National Environmental Protection Act, and the APA are not given
Chevron deference. 13 3 If no agency is charged with rulemaking or
adjudicatory duties under a statutory scheme, then deference to
agency interpretations of that statute is not warranted because
Congress did not delegate interpretive authority to any specific
agency. 134 It is presumed that courts, not agencies, are the institutions
to which Congress delegated interpretive authority in that context. 135
2. Chevron Deference & Agencies with Overlapping Jurisdictions
Even where Congress clearly delegates interpretive authority
to the executive branch, the Court has strongly implied that Chevron
deference carries with it a presumption that such authority is granted
to just one agency, if at all. Martin v. Occupational Safety and Health
Review Commission 36 and ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri 37 both
serve as helpful examples. In Martin, the Court addressed two
conflicting agency interpretations of a provision in the Occupational
Safety and Health Act. 138 Both the Secretary of Labor and the Health
Review Commission were delegated authority under the statute, but
the Court framed the question as follows: "The question before [the
Court] in this case is to which administrative actor-the Secretary or
the Commission-did Congress delegate this 'interpretive' lawmaking
power under the OSH Act."1 39 The Court's question implicitly assumes

132. Cooney, supra note 2, at 8 ("Federal Courts traditionally have refused to grant Chevron
deference to agency interpretations of laws of general applicability, such as the Freedom of
Information Act or the National Environmental Protection Act, that no specific agency is granted
authority to implement." (citing Grand Canyon Trust v. FAA, 290 F.3d 339, 341-42 (D.C. Cir.
2002))).
133. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron's Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 894
(2001).
134. Id. at 894-95.
135. BRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 140; Lemos, supra note 8, at 373-80 (discussing the
choice between agencies or courts administering statutes).

136. 499 U.S. at 146.
137. 484 U.S. 495 (1988).
138. 29 U.S.C. § 654 (2012).
139. Martin, 499 U.S. at 151; see also Gersen, supra note 8, at 242-43 (discussing the way
the Court framed the issue and the implications of that fact in support of the proposition that the
Court employs an "exclusive jurisdiction canon").
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that Congress meant to delegate interpretive authority to only one
administrative agency.140
More recently, in Gonzales v. Oregon, the Court used Martin to
analyze whether an interpretive rule issued by the U.S. Attorney
General warranted deference.141 Quoting language from Martin, the
Court relied on Chevron's rationale to suggest that courts should
identify one agency that Congress intended to delegate lawmaking
authority to under a given statute:
Because historical familiarity and policymaking expertise account in the first instance
for the presumption that Congress delegates interpretive lawmaking power to the
agency rather than to the reviewing court, we presume here that Congress intended to
invest interpretive power in the administrative actor in the best position to develop
14 2
these attributes.

Gonzales demonstrates that once the Court decides that Congress did
in fact intend to delegate lawmaking authority to the federal
bureaucracy, the question then becomes to which agency.143 Courts
have struggled to apply this one-agency model to multiagency
delegations;144 as Congress continues delegating authority to multiple
agencies, courts have increasingly strained Chevron and the other
deference frameworks.1 45
B. While the Court Has Taken a More Contextual Approach Since
Chevron, It Still Defers to a Single Agency
The additions of the Step Zero inquiry in Mead and the
doctrinal modifications in other recent cases demonstrate that the
Court has eschewed the notion that Chevron deference applies across
the board and is opting instead for a "subject-matter-driven ad hoc
approach."146 In some cases, the Court has been willing to take a closer
look into congressional motives in order to tailor judicial deference to
the varied ways in which Congress actually delegates authority.147
140. Gersen, supra note 8, at 223. The Court employed a similar rationale in ETSI Pipeline
Project v. Missouri, when it held that the statute granted one executive actor exclusive authority
to resolve claims of concurrent jurisdiction. 484 U.S. at 505-06; Gersen, supra note 8, at 223-24.
141. Gersen, supra note 8, at 225.
142. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 266-67 (2006) (quoting Martin, 499 U.S. at 153)
(reasoning that "[tihis presumption works against a conclusion that the Attorney General has
authority to make quintessentially medical judgments").
143. Gersen, supra note 8, at 242.
144. See, e.g., Gonzales, 546 U.S. at 250-75 (interpreting the Controlled Substances Act).
145. Cooney, supra note 2, at 7; Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1168 (speaking
specifically about the prevalence of these delegations in the Dodd-Frank Act).
146. Eskridge & Baer, supranote 87, at 1179.
147. Bressman, supra note 13, at 2012.
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Justice Breyer seems more willing than his colleagues to
differentiate between various types of delegations based on the
context.148 Highlighting the political-accountability rationale for
deference in his dissent in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., Justice
Breyer wrote: "[An independent] agency's comparative freedom from
ballot-box control makes it all the more important that courts review
its decisionmaking to assure compliance with applicable provisions of
the law." 1 49 While the majority rejected this reasoning,150 Breyer's
dissent matches earlier decisions in which a majority of the Court
decided whether or not to accord deference based on the particular
nature of the delegation regime.15 1
The Court's departure from automatic Chevron deference to a
particularized examination of the statute typically suggests that the
Court will give less deference to an agency.152 This was the case in
Mead, which denied deference after establishing the Step Zero
departure from Chevron, and in Brown & Williamson, which denied
deference under the elephants-in-mouseholes doctrine.153 In the latter
case, the Court technically used the Chevron framework, but it
nonetheless plunged into a particularized inquiry at Step One to rebut
the presumption of delegation and deny the agency deference.154
In some instances, however, the Court has undertaken a
particularized inquiry and still finds that Chevron should be invoked,
even when the agency action seemed to fail Step Zero.' 55 In Barnhart
v. Walton, for instance, the Court found that Chevron applied despite
the fact that the agency had acted outside of notice-and-comment
rulemaking.15 6 Writing for the Court, Justice Breyer explained why a
particularized inquiry warranted Chevron application:

148. See, e.g., FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 546-52 (2009) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that an agency faces varying degrees of explanation in lawfully justifying a
policy change depending on the circumstances).
149. Id. at 547.
150. Id. at 523.
151. See, e.g., Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 221 (finding Chevron deference warranted despite the
lack of notice-and-comment rulemaking); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S.
120, 133 (2000) (declining to grant Chevron deference due to the salience of the issue).
152. Id.
153. See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 227 (2001) (holding the agency failed at
Step One); Brown & Williamson, 529 U.S. at 161 (holding the same).
154. See Bressman, supra note 13, at 2018-21 (discussing the particularized inquiry). Brown
& Williamson is credited with establishing the "elephants-in-mouseholes" doctrine.
155. Id. at 2021-22.
156. 535 U.S. at 221-22.
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[Tlhe interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the
importance of the question to administration of the statute, the complexity of that
administration, and the careful consideration the Agency has given the question over a
long period of time all indicate that Chevron provides the appropriate legal lens through
15 7
which to view the legality of the Agency interpretation.

The Court has also taken into account "[c]onsiderations other
than language" to find a statutory provision to be ambiguous and the
agency's interpretation reasonable even when the statutory text
suggested the agency was incorrect. 15 8 In Zuni Public School District
v. Department of Education, the Court held that it was reasonable for
the Secretary of Education to interpret a statutory provision as
requiring him to equalize expenditures among school districts by
creating a formula based on expenditures among students, despite
strong textualist arguments that the statute required a formula that
distributed expenditures among Local Education Agencies.1 59 To
Justice Scalia's chagrin, the Court did not engage in a
"straightforward matter of statutory interpretation," based first on the
text of the statute. 160 Zuni shows how the Court sometimes analyzes
Step One with the Chevron rationales in mind.
These deviations from an absolute Chevron presumption, both
to deny deference when the statutory language suggests it is
warranted and to grant deference in Zuni despite language suggesting
deference was not warranted, show the Court's willingness to examine
the context surrounding a delegation to determine whether to give the
agency interpretive deference. Although this approach resulted in
various levels of deference to agencies, the common strand through
both ultradeferential decisions and less deferential ones is that the
Court has always deferred to one agency.161 Coordinated, multiagency
rules present problems for the Chevron framework, even with the
Court's practical, ad hoc approach.162

157. Id. at 222.
158. See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 90 (2007).
159. See id. at 109-13 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing how the language of the statute
clearly precluded the Secretary's interpretation); see also id. at 104-05 (Stevens, J., concurring)
(resting his agreement with the majority on an argument that the 'literal application of [the]
statute [would] produce a result" contrary to congressional intent).
160 Id. at 111 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
161. See, e.g., Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1204 n.326 (noting that, although the Court
reviewed a joint rule, it "accept[ed] the EPA's interpretation as correct using a traditional test[,]"
and "accorded no weight to the mere fact that the agencies had cooperated in producing the
regulation" (emphasis added)).
162. Cooney, supra note 2, at 7; Eskridge & Baer, supra note 87, at 1179 (discussing the
Court's ad hoc approach to questions of deference).
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C. The Rise in Multiagency Delegation
Congress often creates shared policy jurisdiction by delegating
authority to multiple agencies. Whether Congress uses one statute or
many, the delegation of overlapping authority to different agencies
pervades congressional lawmaking. Statutes administered by multiple
agencies are ubiquitous.163 The desirability of overlapping policy
jurisdiction is widely debated, but it is a hallmark of U.S. regulatory
schemes.16 4
There are a number of potential explanations for the
proliferation of jurisdictional overlap, including the nature of the
congressional committee system, 165 the piecemeal basis upon which
different Congresses enact regulatory regimes over time, 166 and
deliberate decisions by Congress to delegate to different agencies. 167
While much of the literature is critical of the practice, scholars have
presented strong arguments that justify duplicative delegations and
overlapping jurisdictions. 16 8 For example, Professor Jacob Gersen has
argued that Congress purposefully employs different types of
regulatory overlap to provide institutional checks that help ensure
that the statute is administered well and according to Congress's
wishes.169

Furthermore, Professors Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi have
suggested ways to improve agency coordination despite "fragmented
overlapping delegations of power to administrative agencies." 170
Freeman and Rossi believe that Congress purposefully creates
jurisdictional overlap and "eschew characterizing such delegations as
redundant," instead viewing jurisdictional overlap as "shared
regulatory space." 171 Further, these scholars have suggested
institutional design mechanisms to improve agency coordination to
better advance the benefits of jurisdictional overlap, implicitly
163. See, e.g., Gersen, supra note 8, at 208 ("[W]e live in an age of overlapping and
concurring regulatory jurisdiction." (internal citation omitted)).
164. BRESSMAN ET AL., supranote 11, at 140-41.
165. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1139.
166. Id. at 1143.
167. Gersen, supra note 8, at 208-09 (explaining how Congress might reason about deciding
whether to delegate authority to administer a statute to one or multiple agencies and the variety
of schemes it could employ in the latter case).
168. Freeman & Rossi, supranote 8, at 1140-43 (discussing reasons Congress might want to
use overlapping jurisdictions to control agency behavior); Gersen, supra note 8, at 208-09.
169. Gersen, supra note 8, at 212-15 (discussing the competing agents framework).
170. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1134.
171. Id. at 1136.
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recognizing that some inefficiencies result from shared regulatory
space. 172 Whatever the precise nature of jurisdictional overlap and
whether the benefits are advanced by increased coordination, joint
rules pose a unique challenge for courts applying the one-agency
framework from Chevron.
D. CoordinatedJoint-RulemakingAuthority Does Not Fit Within the
Current Deference Framework
Existing theories of judicial deference are not flexible enough to
accommodate multiple agencies. Because Chevron and other deference
frameworks are one-agency models, 173 they do not neatly apply to
circumstances where Congress-in a sense-delegated authority to a
new entity. When Congress requires agencies to work out their
differences and promulgate a rule together, Congress has not simply
delegated to one agency individually; it has delegated to the entire
group of agencies as a monolith. When Congress mandates
coordinated, joint rulemaking, courts cannot possibly presume that
Congress intended only one of the agencies to have authority to
interpret the statute. 174 But, based on Martin and Gonzales, the Court
seems averse to the idea that multiple agencies could have
interpretive authority over the same statute.175 Even as the Court has
taken a more contextualized approach to the issue of deference after
Chevron, it has never declared that multiple agencies could have
interpretive authority as a unit.176 Coordinated, joint rulemaking
presents an opportunity for the Court to apply its contextualized
approach and extend interpretive deference to multiple agencies
acting as one delegate.

172. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1137 ("We argue that, as a general matter, greater
inter-agency coordination will be desirable where it helps to maximize the purported strengths of
shared regulatory space by preserving 'functional' aspects of overlap and fragmentation, while
minimizing its dysfunctions in terms of compromised efficiency, effectiveness, and
accountability.").
173. See supra Part III.A (discussing Chevron's development as a one-agency model).
174. Such a view would be out of line with the approach the Court has taken to finding
contextual indicators that Congress did in fact intend to delegate interpretive authority. Based
on Mead and Barnhart, informal notice-and-comment-rulemaking authority seems to be the
clearest indicator of interpretive authority. In the case of mandated joint-rulemaking, a group of
agencies has been delegated interpretive authority by Congress.
175. Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243, 266 (2006) ("Congress intended to invest interpretive
power in the administrative actor in the best position to develop [policymaking expertise]."
(quoting Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144, 153 (1990))).
176. See supra Part III.B.
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IV. ULTRA DEFERENCE FOR COORDINATED, MULTIAGENCY RULES

The Court should alter its current approach to judicial review
by according a high level of deference to the amalgams of coordinated
agencies that promulgate rules together. This approach breaks from
past judicial treatment of agencies with overlapping jurisdiction, but
according the fused agencies heightened deference stays true to the
central pillars of Chevron and respects Congress's choice of delegatethe fused agencies.
When Congress grants authority to multiple agencies to
promulgate joint rules interpreting a vague statute, it has not
delegated interpretive authority to just one agency. Rather, it has
vested interpretive authority in an amalgam of agencies, acting in
coordination. When Congress delegates in this fashion, it carefully
designs extrajudicial checks-including coordination and deliberation
requirements-to capitalize on agency policy expertise and increase
political accountability.' 7 7 Congress legislates against the backdrop of
Chevron and the APA, so when it chooses to delegate broad authority
to an agency to promulgate rules, it also grants the agency authority
to carry out the provisions of the statute and resolve the meaning of
ambiguous terms.178 This reasoning applies with even more force
when Congress carefully designs a regulatory regime that delegates
joint-rulemaking authority to coordinated agencies. The only step the
Court needs to take is to recognize the choice Congress is making and
afford the amalgam of agencies deference when they are granted
coordinated, joint-rulemaking authority under statutes like DoddFrank.
A. Congress Spoke Clearly
Statutes delegating broad joint-rulemaking authority are
"elephant holes." For example, the Volcker Rule is a big deal, but the
statutory grant of authority is broad, and Congress used institutional
checks, including deliberation and coordination requirements, to

177. See Gersen, supra note 8, at 208-10 (discussing how Congress purposefully designs
overlapping delegation regimes); Katyal, supra note 57, at 2317 (discussing the benefits of
multiple agency perspectives).
178. See Lemos, supra note 8, at 370-73 (discussing the choice of delegating to agencies or
courts); see also Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the
Inside-An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting,Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65
STAN. L. REV. 901, 955 (discussing how Congressional staffers write legislation understanding
the implications of Chevron).
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ensure that the resulting rules are good ones. 179 Indeed, it is hard to
imagine a statutory scheme that delegates more broadly and with
such strong extrajudicial checks as the joint-rulemaking delegations in
Dodd-Frank.o80 Clearly, the scheme passes the Step Zero inquiry of
Mead,181 and it even goes further by requiring consultation and other
procedures before rules are promulgated.182
A broad statutory mandate to multiple agencies and the
requirement of joint promulgation of rules indicate that Congress
intended to delegate interpretive authority to agencies, not courts.1 83
By requiring coordinated, joint rulemaking to implement a vague
provision of a statute, Congress requires the multiple agencies to use
their varying expertise to come to a consensus. This coordination
requirement is a powerful check, which further indicates that
Congress wants the agencies to have the final word on interpreting
the statute. When Congress gives this type of clear indication of to
whom it wants to delegate interpretive authority to implement the
statute, Courts should be ultradeferential to the agencies'
resulting interpretations.184 As the Court noted in Mead,
"[G]enerally ... Congress contemplates administrative action with the
effect of law when it provides for a relatively formal administrative
procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation that should
underlie a pronouncement of such force." 185 In cases of coordinated,
joint rulemaking, Congress not only provides formal administrative
procedures, but it also requires coordination and consensus-building,
facilitating even more fairness and deliberation. 8 6

179. Furthermore, the fact that Congress has continued to monitor the process through
oversight hearings suggests that the political accountability rationale for Chevron is apparent.
See Patterson & Solomon, supra note 3 ("At a tense congressional hearing in June 2012, (a
Senator] showed his impatience [with the rulemaking process].").
180. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (2012)); see also
Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1168 (discussing the potential increase in joint rulemaking
and the mandate of consultation in Dodd-Frank).
181. BRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 718.
182. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 619; Cooney, supra
note 2, at 7; Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1168.
183. See Lemos, supra note 8, at 369-72 (discussing the factors that go into choosing whether
courts or agencies will implement a statute).
184. See id. at 364-65 (discussing the choice between courts and agencies).
185. 533 U.S. 218, 230 (2001).
186. See Cooney, supranote 2, at 7 (discussing the consultation and coordination procedures
in Dodd-Frank); see also infraPart IV.B.2 (discussing how political accountability is enhanced by
broad deference for joint rules). That section suggests that since more parties are involved in the
process, there is more political accountability and salience. Thus, the final rules will be more
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B. The Twin RationalesBehind Chevron Support Broad Deference for
Jointly PromulgatedRules
Although Chevron has so far been a one-agency model, the
twin rationales behind Chevron deference-agency expertise and
political accountability-counsel in favor of deference to multiple
agencies promulgating joint rules in coordination. First, Congress
capitalizes on more and different kinds of agency expertise when it
requires multiple agencies to promulgate rules together. This kind of
delegation also improves agency coordination, a good in and of itself.18 7
The benefits of agency expertise are enhanced when Congress requires
coordination among multiple agencies.188 By bringing regulators with
multiple areas of expertise to the table to fill in the gaps of a vague
statute, coordinated, joint rulemaking likely produces better policy.' 89
While some have similar areas of expertise, agencies have unique
statutory and institutional missions. So when Congress compels
agencies to coordinate in promulgating rules, a combination of expert
perspectives forms the basis of the resulting rule.190 This both ensures
that the rule takes into account the various interests served by the
different agencies and reduces the likelihood of negative consequences.
This process also ensures that the joint rules are well-reasoned. When
Congress delegates authority to a group of agencies to issue joint
rules, it creates a foundation for regulations built upon superexpertise. The presence of increased agency expertise counsels in favor
of judicial deference.
In addition to increased expertise, delegation to multiple
agencies also enhances political accountability for the resulting policy
choices. Congress will likely require more agency process,
coordination, and deliberation for important policy issues. 191 The fact
likely to take a broader range of views into account and be more "fair" in terms of notice to those
affected by them.
187. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1211 ("[G]iven their benefits, coordination tools
merit a place alongside other, more conventionally-studied administrative procedures.").
188. See Katyal, supra note 57, at 2317 (discussing the benefits of having more regulators at
the table negotiating a decision).
189. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1184 (discussing the impact of coordination on
agency expertise and the quality of agency decisionmaking).
190. BRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 40, 139-42 (discussing how career civil servants can
influence policymaking within an agency and how statutory delegations differ).
191. This makes intuitive sense. If the issue is salient, Congress will likely devote more time
to it. If it requires expertise, Congress will be more likely to delegate authority to fill in the gaps
to an agency or agencies. If both of these factors are at play, Congress will likely pay close
attention to the institutional design and extrajudicial checks on the delegates to ensure that the
final policies reflect Congress's intention in passing the statute.
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that multiple agencies are pouring time and energy into a rule
increases the salience of the issue because more stakeholders will be
aware of and invested in the decisionmaking process. Further, when
some of the coordinated agencies are executive and others are
independent-as is the case in the Volcker Rule delegation-both
Congress and the President will exert some amount of influence over
different agencies within the monolith that will eventually promulgate
the rule.19 2 Thus, a more deferential approach will also serve
Chevron's goal of political accountability.
C. The Court Should Limit JudicialReview to Ensuring that Agencies
Comply with the ExtrajudicialChecks Congress Included
in the Statute
When Congress delegates joint-rulemaking authority to a
group of agencies and includes a coordination requirement, courts
should limit review in a way analogous to the arbitrary and capricious
standard under the APA.19 s In doing so, the Court would recognize the
fact that Congress spoke clearly and would avoid reviewing the
substance of the rule. Instead, the Court would simply ensure that the
agencies complied with the procedures mandated by Congress (i.e., the
consultation and coordination requirements in the case of joint rules).
Given Congress's delegation to an amalgam, careful
institutional design, and extrajudicial checks, courts should have little
role, if any, in reviewing the substance of joint rules. Rather, courts
should merely ensure that the agencies, acting together, complied
with the mandatory procedural requirements of the APA and the
delegating statute. In this way, courts will defer to agencies when they
have particular expertise and remain politically accountable-the
rationales embraced in Chevronl94-but the courts will remain the

192. See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 44, at 25 (discussing how Congress chooses whether to
create an independent or executive agency based on the relative control the legislative and
executive branches exercise over each); see also Patterson & Solomon, supra note 3 (discussing
how Treasury Secretary Jack Lew prodded the agencies to finalize a rule in early 2013).
193. 5 U.S.C. § 706(1), (2)(A) (2012) ("['The reviewing court shall ... compel agency action
unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and hold unlawful and set aside agency action,
findings, and conclusions found to be arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise
not in accordance with law."). Section 706 goes on to include other specific ways for courts to
review agency procedures. Id. § 706(2)(B)-(F).
194. See, e.g., Merrill & Hickman, supra note 133, at 866 ("[Chevron] argues that agencies
typically have greater expertise about technical and specialized subjects than do courts, and that
agencies are indirectly accountable to the public through the elected President, whereas federal
courts are not.").
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vanguard of procedural and constitutional protections.195
The Supreme Court should adopt an ultradeferential standard
for judicial review of multiagency rules with consultation
requirements. Whether this means the Court applies Chevron
deference to the amalgam of agencies charged with coordinating and
issuing rules or one of its many other deference regimes,196 the Court
should give greater deference because of the statutory context in
which coordinated, joint rules arise. This contextual approach is
consistent with how the Court has approached deference in the past,197
and it respects clear indications from Congress that it wants to
delegate broad policymaking authority to an amalgam of agencies.198
Granting broad deference for congressional delegations of jointrulemaking authority would also recognize the nuance with which
Congress delegates to agencies and provide a more realistic
framework for courts to evaluate agency decisions.199 This approach
could prompt an increase in agency coordination, 2 0 0 which would
effectuate better policy. More broadly, increased deference would be a
signal to Congress that the Court is paying attention to how and to
whom Congress delegates authority. 20 1 This signal could prod
Congress to be even more willing to provide extrajudicial checks on
delegation regimes, which could improve agency coordination,
accountability, and efficacy on a larger scale. 202 The more attentive the
Court, the more likely Congress will carefully structure delegations to
give expert agencies sufficient authority while still ensuring an

195. BREYER, supra note 24, at 110-11 ("Courts are more likely to have experience with
procedures, basic fairness to individuals, and interpreting the Constitution . . . . Agencies,
however, are more likely to have experience with facts and policy matters related to their
administrative missions.").
196. Eskridge & Baer, supra note 87, at 1098-100.
197. Id. at 1179; see also Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep't of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 89-90
(2007) ("[W]e depart from a normal order of discussion ... that first considers Zuni's statutory
language argument. Instead, because of the technical nature of the language in question, we
shall first examine the provision's background and basic purposes.").
198. See BRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 11, at 140 (discussing the choice to delegate to either
courts or agencies); see also supra Part IV (discussing how Congress sometimes delegates to an
entity comprised of multiple agencies).
199. See supra Part II.A.2 (discussing congressional delegation regimes).
200. In a recent article, Professors Jody Freeman and Jim Rossi discussed how such a shift
in judicial review could potentially promote agency coordination, but they stopped short of
suggesting that courts take that approach. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1168, 1205.
201. Cf. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 133, at 836, 872 (2001) (discussing the importance of
signaling between the Court and Congress).
202. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1209-10 (discussing the coordination tools that
Congress, the President, and agencies can use as well as their relative strengths).
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appropriate measure of political accountability. 203
By requiring interagency collaboration and consultation,
Congress provides a powerful check to ensure that the rules
promulgated under the statute are good ones. 204 Well-crafted
delegations utilize agency expertise to fill in the statutory gaps and
ensure enough political accountability to prevent agencies from
subverting the popular will. 2 0 5 This Note argues that coordinated, joint
rules should warrant less judicial scrutiny than traditional, singleagency rules, and the Court should alter its approach to judicial
deference when Congress delegates interpretive authority to multiple
agencies. 206 The initial rationales offered for providing Chevron
deference to a single agency are all the more prominent when
Congress delegates joint-rulemaking authority to coordinated
agencies. 207
V. CONCLUSION
This Note offers a relatively simple suggestion to a complex
problem: courts should apply an ultradeferential standard-outside of
the traditional, one-agency Chevron framework-to review joint rules
promulgated by multiple agencies according to a statutory mandate.
Clearly, Congress issued broad interpretive authority to a group of
agencies under Dodd-Frank. 208 But the Court's precedents to date

203. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865-66 (1984)
(discussing the potential reasons for Congress's lack of specificity in delegating).
204. See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 8, at 1165-66 ("Perhaps the best example of such [a
joint policymaking] instrument is joint rulemaking, which typically involves two or more
agencies agreeing to adopt a single regulatory preamble and text."); see also id. at 1168-72
(discussing the potential positive effect of increased joint rulemaking on agency coordination).
205. Based on the rationales for courts deferring to agencies given in Chevron and the
subsequent contextual inquiries into congressional intent to see if the rationales were present in
later cases, this is what the Court is looking for when it analyzes agency actions. This is correct
in the sense that "good" delegations are ones in which agencies promulgate rules capitalizing on
their expertise and staying politically accountable.
206. Bressman, supra note 13, at 2015-16 (explaining the Court's two-step approach to
reviewing agency interpretations).
207. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (2012)); see, e.g., Katyal,
supra note 57, at 2317 (discussing the principle that better decisions result when more agencies
are involved in the decisionmaking process).
208. Thus, the Rule will certainly pass Chevron's Step Zero. But, the possibility that courts
could undertake a particularized inquiry at Step One could still plague the regulatory regime
created by the agencies, collectively, to whom Congress delegated power. See Bressman, supra
note 13, at 2018-19 (discussing how the Court has taken a hard look at the statutory regime to
avoid giving deference).
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have not provided deference to multiple agencies' joint interpretation
of a statute. It is therefore unclear how courts will review these jointly
promulgated rules going forward. 209
Adopting an ultradeferential standard for joint rules will show
that courts are willing to defer to Congress's choice of agent even
when Congress delegates in new and innovative ways. It will also
preserve a role for courts to ensure that agencies act fairly and comply
with procedural requirements. Thus, this ultradeferential approach to
jointly-promulgated rules will allow courts and agencies to do what
they each do best. 210 Agencies will leverage their varied expertise to
resolve complex issues of policy and remain politically accountable to
their principals (Congress and the President). And courts will ensure
that the procedures employed by the agencies comply with the
statutes under which Congress delegated the authority.
The Court will likely have a chance to apply an ultradeferential
standard of review for coordinated joint-rules in the relatively near
future. The Volcker Rule was promulgated in December 2013, and it is
the product of five agencies negotiating within their areas of expertise
over how to best implement the broad provisions of Dodd-Frank. 211
Many stakeholders weighed in through the notice-and-comment
process. Both Congress and executive branch officials attended
multiple meetings and hearings with the regulators to hash out the
details. The stakes are high, and some financial institutions made
worse off by the Rule will likely seek redress through the judicial
system. Courts will not be able to just "pick an agency" because it is
clear that Dodd-Frank delegated interpretive lawmaking authority to
all five agencies as a collective. 212 When that day comes, courts should
respect Congress's choice and apply an ultradeferential standard of
review to the agencies' final rule.
William Weaver*
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promulgated jointly after inter-agency consultation would be likely to receive deference under
Chevron).
210. See BREYER, supra note 24, at 110-11 (discussing courts' and agencies' comparative
expertise).
211. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124
Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C. (2012)).
212. Cooney, supra note 2, at 7.
*
Candidate for Doctor of Jurisprudence, Vanderbilt University Law School, Class of
2014. I would like to thank the staff of the Vanderbilt Law Review for all of their hard work and
Deans Lisa Bressman and Kevin Stack for their assistance in developing this topic and guidance
throughout the process of writing this Note.

